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THE SOLITARY DAf.:C'ER 
by 
Francis Sparshott 
Music is an art. and so is poetry: there is an art of sculpture. and an art of 
dancing. But how is an an possible .. How is it that a painter or other artist. seeking 
only to be true to his own unique vision, can in doing so produce something that he 
and others will recognize as a work of the well-known art that he practices� The 
question seems at first to be hardly a challenging one. One might as well ask how 
authentic speech and morality are possible. How is it that a person. seeking only to 
express his own unique thought,  can be understood by others as. speaking in a 
familiar language� How can a person of moral autonomy and integrity, taking 
responsibility before all the world for his unique life, yet be seen to be doing 
something that is not only recognizably human but characteristic of members of a 
specific human community� In those two cases. one know what to say. The model 
was articulated at least as early as Aristotle. A child learns the forms of the language 
his family speaks, comes to grasp the grarnmer of that language, makes its principles. 
his own and then us.es them spontaneously to frame thoughts uniquely his. A child 
first does as he is told, then comes to see why he was told that, makes the 
underlying principles his own, and in accordance with these principles fashions 
unselfconsciously the style of his personal life. There is no way to speak or to live 
without speaking some langauge or manifesting some form of culture: to purport to 
speak or to live otherwise is not integrity but idiocy. Rational autonomy is not 
artibtary but rests on the recognition of rightness. 
In articulating his primitive version of this model, Aristotle himself used as 
analogy what I began by asking about, the learning of an art. Specifically. his 
analogy was the process of learning to play a musical instrument. 1l1e novice moves 
his fingers as his teacher tells him. In the course of practice , he comes to recognize 
why it was right to move them so. That recognition is what learning to play really 
comes to, what enables him to play new pieces, and pieces of new sorts. The 
student introjects. the principles of musical order and value, and having made them 
fully his own can make music freely. There is really no other way to learn music: 
the only alternatives are to do it fast and well, or to do is slowly and badly. 
We have thus already at our disposal a persuasive model of what makes an art 
possible. A child, exposed to poetry at school, learns from existing poetry not only 
that poetry is possible, but what possibilities are known to be open to poetry. A 
child who becomes a poet does so by making the possibility of poetry his own, and 
making some part of the range of specific possibilities his own; then, as he matures, 
he extrapolates and interpolates with increasing sureness and boldness new 
possibilities that are his alone. Moreover, once this pattern of mastery , exploitation, 
and origination is grasped, new arts can be created on the model of old arts, as has 
happened with film. It is even possible, as recent decades have shown, to take the 
extrapolation one stage further; to envisage the idea of art in general, and become 
the artist of no particular art. But that is another story . 
Art, then, is possible as language was possible. There is no language without 
languages, no art without arts, and no expression without one or the other of these. 
Tradition is not the enemy of originality; rather, without tradition originality 
cannot be differentiated from random trifling. In fact, the very idea of originality 
requires the idea o f  tradition: an origin requires a determinate point of origination, 
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and cannot be an orig.in unless it admits of a definite continuation. 
The model that yields this easy answer to how arts are possible also enables us to 
see how it is possible to practice an art. rf every work of art is an entirely mew and 
free creation, answerable to no law but its own, it is strange that most such works 
are produced by artists, people who make a regular practice of making them. who 
are committed to that practice and build their lives around it. What could such a 
person be undertaking to do, and how could he be sure of doing it': But now, 
thinking of the implications of our model, we can see that anyone who takes up the 
practice of an art will do so because he has some interest in that art. Th.is, interest 
can only take the form of an unusual susceptibiJHy to at least some of the effects 
specific to that art. Either he will be more strongly affected by them or he will be 
able to dlifferentiate more precisely among them, or he will :simply take them more 
seriously. than other people. Whkhever be the case, the precondition of hlis taking 
up the practice of his art is that he is a more than usually committed and adept 
member of the public for that art. That will htold true even if the practice of the art 
is hereditary in his community, for in that case he will have had the products and 
problems of the art thrust unavoidably on his attention from childhood . The artist, 
then, having first learned from others the possibilities of his art, is equipped and 
disposed to monHor his own performance as his own first auclience. He has no need 
to sacrifice his integrity by striving to please his public; he need not think about 
them at all. because he cannot but be one of them and what satisfies him will of 
necessity satisfy the most discriminating connoisseurs of his art. That applies even 
to the artist "ahead of his time," the solitary genius like Schoenberg. The mastery 
of an art, as of a language or the folkways, starts from imitation of surf ace 
phenomena and proceeds through experimental extrapolation and interpolation in 
the light of hypotheses about the underlying rules to the mastery and introjection 
of the actual formative principles, and so onward througih ever more recondite 
principles and remote analogies. Schoenberg himself insisted that his most 
revolutionary and least appreciated procedures were logical applications and 
extensions of the principles that already lay beneath traditional practices, but at 
such a depth beneath them that they escaped recognition. Provided, then, that the 
revolutionary artist can really appreciate, genuinely feel and see the rightness in, 
what he lis doing, he can be confident that others will also be able to appreciate it, 
for his new principles and new taste were reached by following out the inner 
inclications of existing principles and existing, tastes, indications that were there for 
anyone else to see. The continUity of his new valuations with existing valuations, 
and hence of the value of his new work with that of accepted masterpieces, is 
guaranteed by the necessarily exceptional nature of his knowledge and interest, and 
itself guarantees that others could come to appreciate what he is doing. That 
remains true even if, as often happens, no one ever does come to appreciate it 
because no one cares to follow up the possibilities be has chosen to explore. 
It must be possible to practice an art, because people do practice arts; and 
something like the foregoing account must be right. Any alternative either makes 
artistry more arbitrary than is compatible with the relative stability of artistic 
practices, or more rulebound than is compatible with the creativity we demand of 
art. None the less, there are three familiar objections to the thesis that an artist can 
effectively monitor his work as his own first public and critic. The fust objection 
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points out that. since the artist already knows what he is trying to do, he cannot 
effectively distinguish between what he intended and what he has managed to 
achieve. He cannot help seeing the pattern he has built in to his work. but others 
may not notice it because it may be confused with or overlaid by other structural 
features. Other aspects of the work, which the artist dismissed as neglibible or did 
not even notice. ma� dominate the perception of those who do not share his 
preliminary bias. Since the artist can never know that this is not happening. he can 
never assume the position of dist interested observer or fair-01inded critic. 
The second objection is that an artist cannot but see in his work the outcome of 
the process of creating it. He must apprehend in it the vectors that brought it where 
it is. But spectators and critics come at the work cold. find it having the fom1 that 
it has: the only processes it can embody for them are those whereby they 
discovered its form, and these are virtually certain to be quite unlike those by 
which it was buiH up. The work as the public knows it is not therefore accessible to 
the artist, who again cannot serve as a sample of his own public. 
The third objection is one argued by Sartre in What Is Literature'?: a novelist can 
never read his own novel, because the essence of reading is the free movement of 
the mind in the face of a story that unfolds in a way that on first reading is 
unforeseen and even on re·reading represents a sheer factuality that the reader did 
not devise and cannot control. This essential experience of confrontation is one the 
author cannot have; he cannot therefore be his own first reader, and must await the 
exercise of another's freedom for the realization of his work. 
Some theorists make much of these three objections, but they are trivial. They 
point to important truths, but the truths do not affect the basic position I have 
outlined. The first two, at least, raise merely practical difficulties. Certainly they 
entail that an artist may miscalculate and misjudge . And so he can, but what of 
that" The successful practice of an art does not require that the artist be infallible. 
Infallibility is not a human trait: Homer nods, Shakespeare goofs. The difficulties 
raised are of a sort that an. artist should be aware of and try to allow for. It remains 
true that the work he produces belongs to an art in which he takes more than 
common interest and of which he has more than common knowledge. Thms 
knowledge and interest do not magically abandon him. He knows what it is to be a 
member of the public for a work not his own; this stance remains normal and 
habitual for him, and when monitoring his own work in progress or completed i t  
wilt" be the stance most natural for him to adopt. Of course he has a special bias 
which he needs to discount .  But this bias is not more severe, but only more 
systematic, than those which threaten the perceptiveness and impartiality of critics 
and public, each of whom remains in the face of the work the quirky individual he 
inevitably is. 
The third objection, the one I raised in the name of Sartre, is of a different 
order. It purports to be not a psychological problem but a difficulty in principle; 
that the experience of the public is essentially that of one who is not the artist, but 
whose freedom confronts the effect of another's freedom as something fixed and 
alien which he must incorporate into his own life as he incorporates other matters 
of fact. But Sartre himself soon came to see that the difficulty was illusory. What I 
have done myself becomes, as part of past reality, no less and no more alien to me 
than to anyone else. Once again, all we have really to take into account is the 
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artist's need to establish a little distance between himself and his work. to imagine 
and anticipate as best he can the separateness that time will in the end achieve. 
A much more radical critique of our standard explanation of how it is possible 
to combine integrity with reliability and accessibility and mus to practice an art 
was mounted 50 years ago by C. J Ducasse. He rejected the whole model out of 
hand. The model supposes that, when an artist learns his art by studying the works 
of others, what he learns is a repertoire of me�hods for achieving a range of effects, 
within and beyond which he develops his own methods and effects. But this. says 
Ducasse, is not what we think of as art at all. It is mere technique . Art as we 
understand it is not manipulation but expression . What existing art confronts a 
budding artist with is successful expressions of experiences, and what he learns 
from them is the possibility of expressing oneself in an art. The works of others 
were not made for him but for their own sakes, as achieved expressions of their 
artists' visions, and his interest in art amounts to a developed appreciation of such 
achievements. He cannot, then, consistently assess his own work as member of the 
public, for he must know that works of art are not made for publics. As artist, the 
criterion by which he monitors his own success is fidelity ; whether what he has 
done answers precisely to what he had in mind to express--or rather, since a work 
grows in the mind as one makes it, whether it exactly expresses what in the process 
of creation he has come to have in mind to express. The question he asks of his 
work as an artist is not whether it will satisfy a public, or whether it is beautiful or 
a good piece of work, but always: Is this just what I meant, and mean. Is it exactly 
right� 
But the criterion of rightness, the only one by which an artist as such can judge 
his work not only makes neither direct nor indirect reference to the perceptions of 
a possible public, but is one that no one other than the artist either can or should 
apply. They should not apply it, because whether the work is what the artist meant 
is something that concerns only the artist himself and his mother; and they cannot 
apply it because they have no other appropriate source of information about what 
the work was meant to express than the perceptible properties of the work itself. 
Public and critics, thus cut off from the only relevant criterion for judging and 
appreciating works of art, rightly go by whatever criteria they please : their own 
enjoyment, conventional canons of beauty, political orthodoxy, or whatever else 
comes to mind. 
Ducasse 's position, like many philosophical positions, is at the same time 
irrefutable and preposterous. It is preposterous because the situation he describes is 
one in which artists use one criterion of success and critics and public have 
indefinitely many other criteria of success, criteria which have nothing in common 
except that the artist's criterion cannot be one of them. Yet Ducasse does not and 
cannot deny that the public is the public for the art and the critics are critics of the 
art: he cannot deny that, because the very notions of a public and of a critic require 
tt:"'"'Nor cart he deny that artists spend much of their lives in the service of an art for 
which there is a public and of which there are critics. How could this intimate 
symbiosis occur' if the two sets of standardsare related only by being mutually 
exclusive: Ducasse does not explain. In fact, he seldom shows himself aware that 
such a symbiosis exists. Usually, he mention:s artists only to complain that they 
know notlhing about art, being preoccupied with irrelevant matters like technique. 
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A true work or art is most likely 10 be produced by a novice and appreciated by an 
ignoramus. Ducasse does not say that in so many words. but it is in fact what he 
argues. and it is the only position he can consistently 1ake. 
It is easy for us to see what has gone wrong with Ducasse s argument. and how it 
is to be put right, because in stating his position I falsified it by supplying the 
required answer to a question he never thinks of asking: namely. how does a naive 
person who produces a work of art acquire the idea of art in the first place. and 
what is the idea he acquires·) The appropriate answer for Ducasse has to be the one 
l put into his mouth: that the novice fmds himself in a world in which people an.' 
expressing feelings and thoughts. and picks up from them the notion 1hat 
expressing feelings and thoughts are things a person can do But if that is so. 
Ducasse is quite wrong in saying that critics and the public are cut off frorn the 
only appropriate sort of standard for assessing art. He has to be wrong. or his 
readers would be unable to understand what he is saying. To understand him, we 
have to know in general tem1s what it is for an idea or a feeling to be expressed. and 
it is this knowledge that supplies the appropriate standard for appreciating art. 
Ducasse is right to say that we cannot know and should not care whether what an 
artist expresses is what he wanted to express; but that by no means prevents us 
from telling whether something has been given adequate expression . The solidarity 
of artist and public is sufficiently secured, on Ducasse's terms. if the common 
humanity of artist and audience assures that what is especially meaningful for the 
one could be especially meaningful for the others. From there one can proceed in 
various directions. and theorists both before and after Ducasse have done so. 
Meanwhile, however one works out the details, enough of our original model is 
back in place. We never said that an artist sets out to please his public, only that his 
own satisfaction in his worlk was sufficient guarantee that it was such that 
satisfaction could be taken in it.  And now we can say in Ducasse ·s name, though 
against his intention and indeed over his long-dead body, that an artist's recognition 
that what he has done is exactly right in the light of his own vision is sufficie·nt 
guarantee that there is a possible vision in the light of which a certain rightness has 
been attained. And we may add that the achieving of any sort of humanly 
recognizable rightness is no light matter. Art depends on and expfoits the fact that 
human beings can, in virtue of their humanity, come to understand each other, 
though they can misunderstand each other too.1 
If the foregoing analysis is correct, Ducasse 's objection after all poses no serious 
threat to our preferred model of how an art and its practice are possible. The work 
an artist produces is after all the same for him as for his public, materially accessible 
to both in the same way and ideally the same perceptible object for both. But there 
is one kind of case in which that does not hold. The dance that a dancer performs 
before an audience is a worlc of art that consists of the visible pattern the dancer's 
body makes, together with the meanings that are carried by those visible postures 
and movements:. The members of the audience do not, of course, all have the same 
visual experience, for they see the dancer from different angles and distances. But 
visible objects are always seen from some specific angle; our visible world is one in 
which unvarying objects appear in varying conditions. So there is no problem in 
saying that all members of the audience see the same dance as well as the same 
dancer, even if not all see it in the same way or equally well. But the dancer does 
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not see his body at all, unless quite incidentally the dance calls for bits of it to 
c<Jme into his field of vision. So the dancer cannot see his dance: his work of art is 
not accessible to him as it is to his audience. So he cannot be his own first aud!ience. 
The general answer we offered to the question how it is possible to practice an art. 
namely th.at the artist's awareness of his own work is a suffic.:iently reliable 
guarantee of what an audjence·s awareness could be, simply does not apply to 
dancers. Either our account was wrong after aJI, or dancers cannot be practicing an 
art in the same way that other artists do. Which are we to say'> 
Sooner or later, obviously, such an inquiry will have to be pursued by �king a 
lot of dancers, of different kinds and at different stages of their careers, what they 
do and how they do it. But first we may think about the question for ourselves, if 
only to figure out just what questions we need to ask. Dancers as such are not 
theorists, and statements they volunteer about their professional activities are 
unlikely to perform effectively the function of responsible analysis. 
Someone who is learning ballet or one of the other classicail schools of dance is 
shown by the ballet-master the basic movements and positions of the body and its 
parts, and drilled and corrected until he gets them right.  Presumably his body 
retains the feel of a movement so that he can repeat it reliably, in the way that we 
all learn to make any bodily movement. Presumably, too, like a pianist who 
acquires the ability to play unfamiliar music by generalizing his ability to play 
specific pieces and by applying such verbal precepts as may be intelligible and 
appropriate at the stage he has reached in his trailing, a dancer passes through 
successive stages at which he can perform with artistic success ever wider ranges of 
new dances, simply because what will look right has now come to feel right for him. 
And he will depend a great deal on mirrors, discovering for himself what looks right 
and how it feels when it is done. So, we may say, one learns to dance as one learns 
to do anything else. In aU such learning, one comes to know what the effect of an 
action will be. In driving a car, for instance, one's movements are guided by 
feedback from the effect of the movements one has just made. and is continuing to 
make; but in an important way that feedback is always too late. One cannot drive 
by making mistakes and then correcting them, because by then the accident will 
have happened. What guides one has to be knowledge of what the effect of one's 
presen t action is going to be. Still more obviously , a person shooting at a target 
corrects his aim by noting the effect of the shot he has just fired, but has to be 
guided immediately by a sense of where the shot he is now firing will hit. The 
function of the feedback is to make this anticipatory conviction more reliable. And 
so, one supposes, the dancer dances by an immediate feeling for what the effect of 
his dancing will be-just as the visual artist, in the case we began with, makes his 
drawing in the light of his feel for what drawings are and should be, but is 
immediately guided by a sense of the rightness of the line he is now drawing. 
There is, however, one crucial difference between dancing and these other skills. 
The car driver, though sustained by faith in the movements he makes from moment 
to moment, is acting in the light of a continuing context of action and situation of 
which he is directly aware and in terms of which the success of his performance is 
appropriately assessed. So too with the marksman, and even with the draftsman, 
who, though he draws each line with unerring spontaneity, is all the time engaged in 
making a drawing, the whole of which he sees :as he adds to i t  and corrects it .  The 
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developing work of art is present to him as a visible thing, in the perceptual mode in 
which the completed drawing will be present to its public. But that can never be 
true of the dancer. Even if the dancer is working before a mirror. his image will be 
only fitfully present to him unless, as can seldom be the case, the dance itself 
demands of him a fixed gaze. Normally, he must work as it were in the dark, like a 
photographer who cannot see what he has done till the film is developed A dancer 
can use the eyes of colleagues and teachers to supplement his own, and he can make 
videotapes in the light of which he can make changes. But what he can never do is 
use as immediate guide in the creation of his dance the continuing awareness of his 
work in the very perceptual mode for which it was created: that is, to be seen as a 
body in movemen t.  His awareness of his dancing must be in another mode. What 
that other mode could be is a question I will tum lo in about five minutes. But 
before we get on lo that there are a couple of things to note about the other arts. 
First, we should note that the ··other mode" in which the dance is accessible to 
the dancer has. an approximate counterpart in something we mentioned when 
dealing with objections to the model we began with, namely, the visual artist's 
priviledged knowledge of the operations of his art, the tactile sense of making the 
artifact and the sense of labor in invention, neither of which the public can share. 
The draftsman , I said, does have this sense, but he also has direct visual access to 
the relevant appearance of his work as the public views it. To say that a dancer's 
experience of h is work is different in kind from the experience these other artists 
have of theirs is therefore slightly misleading. It is rather that of the two kinds of 
experience they have he has only one directly, and the other only indirectly and 
partially through the use of mirrors and recording devices.2 
The other comment to be made here on the relation between dance and other 
arts is that the artist's lack of direct and appropriate access to his work seems to be 
a feature common to the performing arts. One never hears one's own voice as it 
sounds to others, as a few minutes with a tape recorder suffice to show: we must 
therefore insist that a singer cannot have direct access to the song he sings, as an 
audience hears it. Again,  an instrumentalist in a large orchestra can seldom hear 
anything like what the audience hears; the balance is lost from where he sits. Yet 
again, an actor in a play has only limited and distorted access to the performance he 
takes part in, being the wrong side of the lights, and cannot observe his own 
performance in it. 
These three cases are rather unlike each other. The instrumentalist in the 
orchestra is not an artist at all in the special sense we are considering here, for he 
does not function autonomously. His action is not guided by his own creativity but 
by the score and the conductor's interpretation. Spontaneous creation by groups of 
musicians is confined to ensembles small enough for each member to respond to 
what he and each of the others are doing as individuals. The second case, that of the 
singer who cannot hear what others hear from him, is quite different. Though his 
voice as he hears it is transmitted through his headbones, he does hear it, and the 
variations in what he hears answer to variations in what others hear. So the 
difference between what he hears of himself and what others hear from him is not 
that important. He can in a way hear and be guided by his own singing, and his case 
is not significantly different from that of a painter whose studio lighting is not 
quite the same as that in the gallery or other building in which his painting is to be 
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housed. The singer's access to his work is direct and appropriate. though imperfect. 
The third case, that of the actor, is complex. and is closer to that of the dancer. 
An actor does have the responsibility of creating his character through a 
performance that forms a real artistic entity within the wider work of an that is the 
entire play, and this entity is inaccessible to him in just the way that in ordinary life 
we have no direct awareness of the impression we are making. But the actor can 
after all hear his own voice, with the same sort of limitations that affect the singer: 
and Stanislavsky based his technique as director and teacher of actors on the thesis 
that to concentrate on one's own performance is not the way to succeed. On the 
contrary, once an actor has mastered the basic means of projecting his voice and 
gestures, and thus as it were acquired the habit of living perceptibly, his voice and 
motions will automatically take on the required characteristics if hr imagines with 
sufficient conviction and detail the situation in which he is supposed to be. This 
should work, because the actor's task is to impart to his speech and movements 
more legible forms of just those characters from which in everyday life people 
recognize each others' natures, intentions, feelings, and meanings. His perfomrnnce 
need not be accessible to him, because what he is  called on to do is less to build 
something than to live it out. His creation of his part is less like the creation of 
some such work of art as a painting than it is like the crafty perfonnance of an act 
of motor skill, like driving in an automobile race. The idea of the character he is to 
be, and of his part as a whole, must be present to him as a guiding idea, as the 
racing driver must drive in the light of his notion of how the :race is to be won, but 
not in any way that calls for the role in its entirety to be present. He just has to 
remember who he is  being. 
Of course, Stanislavsky's method of acting is not the only one. Another school 
of acting does think in terms of building up a part from component gestures and 
bits of business, as i t  were externally. No doubt what most actors do is a bit of 
both; aesthelicians of the theater have had a lot to say about the different 
significances of the two extremes of method, and we cannot go into that here .. What 
matters to us is that nothing like Stanislavsky's method is available for most 
dancers, because the parts of dances are not the parts of natural actions. To avoid 
confusion, we should perhaps add that non-naturalistic forms of acting do not 
admit of a Stanislawskian approach and do approximate to dance; and in so far as a 
dance is such that its parts do approach the condition of parts of natural acUons as 
such, that dance belongs to the form of mime that is not a form of dance but is 
opposed to dance. 
We may sum up the effect of our digression by saying that, even if the 
predicament of the work's inaccessibility to the artist is to some extent common to 
all the performing arts, it is the dancer who suffers from it most clearly. So now let 
us resume our main argument where we left off and ask: how can the dancer know 
his dance:' 
If we stipulate that every work of art properly so called is  a creation that i.s both 
autonomous and consciously controlled, that control cannot be exercised through a 
set of rules previously formulated, for that would violate the requirement of 
autonomy. The work itself in its successive stages of completion must be accessible 
so that its rightness can be directly monitored. But a dancer cannot perceive, and 
hence cannot check himself by, the visible dance he is dancing. It follows that if a 
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dance is to meet the stipulated requirements for a work of art it must be accessible 
to the dancer. but in some other cognitive mode. And this other mode will 
presumably be like the knowledge we have of all the actions we consciously 
perform. but shorn of the usual feedback from the ongoing effect of the action in 
its context. 
In asking what fom1 the dancer's knowledge of his dance can take, there are 
three questions we could be asking. One is the psychological question. what form 
the awareness of one's own movements and postures actually does take, the nature 
and reliability of proprioception. Second is the phenomenological question. what 
the dancer as a matter of lived experience is aware of when it is his dance as dance 
of which be is aware. This question, unlike the psychological one. calls ror 
isolation of the experiential essence of dance; the science of psychology knows 
nothing of such essences. And third is a question couched in the mode of a more 
traditional philosophy: what awareness of his dance could a dancer have, that might 
make it possible for his dance to be a work of art. as art is generally understood? 
The first of these questions is for experimental psychologists to investigate; the 
second requires that one be trained both as a dancer and as a phenomenologist. The 
third is the question that concerns us now. 
In what cognitive mode could a dancer have relevant access lo his danc.e as he 
dances it: The likely possibilities are that his access, since it cannot be both visual 
and perceptual as the audience's access is, should be perceptual but not visual, or 
that it should be visual but not perceptual; that it should be neither visual nor 
perceptual is not the kind o f  possibility I am going to consider unless I really have 
to. 
The possibility that a dancer's knowledge of !his dance be perceptual but not 
visual is plausibly fulfilled if and only if his knowledge is kinaesthetic-· that is, if his 
dance is available to him through direct awareness of the feeling of his body in 
motion. His dance as a whole would then be available to him through kinaesthetic 
imagination, as a sort of potential inward Gestalt. The suggestion that this is so has 
been very popular. The possibility is curren tty being examined by Prof. 
Sheets-Johnstone of Temple University; it would be improper for me to try to 
summarize her research before publication, whether l got it right or wrong. But I 
will make four points now. First, if the dance exists for the dancer as a kinaesthetic 
work, then its structural principles and its aesthetic criteria must be kinaesthetic. 
But the dance for its proper audience is articulated not kinaesthetically but visually, 
and its appropriate criteria are in the first instance visual and in the second instance 
expressive. It is too much to expect that every satisfactory kinaesthetic work 
should correspond to a satisfactory visual work; and, if it did, it is hard to see that 
there is any relevant sense in which the two works could be called "the same." It is 
absurd to suggest, as some theorists suggested at the tum of the century in the 
so-called theory of empathy (Einfiihlung), that ou:r visual appreciation of a dance is 
based on the projection onto the dancer of a sympathetic sense in our own bodies 
of the dancer's inner awareness of his body, for, as the corpulent Wolfgang Koehler 
complained, most of us would be quite unable to perform most of the movements a 
dancer makes and would be in agony if we performed the rest. 
The second point is that a dancer's awareness of his body must include 
consciousness of effort, strain, fatigue, and pain--effort and pain often incurred 
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with the express aim of appearing to soar and noat in weightless ecstasy. The viewer 
who is primarily aware of what the dancer is going through is missing the point of 
the dance, even if ignorance of what the dancer is going through debars him from 
appreciating the dancer's achievement. If it is said that only part of a dancer's 
kinaesthetic experience constitutes his knowledge of his dance, our reply must be 
that this part is distinguished from the rest not by any specifically kinaesthetic 
features but by its relevance to the visual aspect of the dancer's movements. 
The third point, an important one for which I am indebted to !Prof. 
Sheets-Johnstone, is that the kinaesthetic body as perceived has no perspectival 
aspect, and the ref ore cannot afford an effective analog to the spatial articulation of 
the dancing body and cannot be an alternative means of access to the dance into 
tenns of which the seen dance could be translated. And the fourth point, which 
again r owe to Sheets-Johnstone, is that we have no actual descriptions of dances in 
kinaesthetic terms; dancers and others who purport to describe their own relevant 
bodily feeHngs invariably do so in terms that are primarily visual. What passes for 
description of inner feelings and the imagination of such feeling is really, in every 
case, a description of the dancer's body-image. When we add to this the 
consideration that dance movements and positions are taught and learned visually, 
we may conclude that there is nothing to be said for the thesis that a dancer's dance 
is available to him through proprioceptive perception and imagination ; rather, we 
shall take the view that the dancer's inner sense of his bodily posture and 
movement serves as information about something the meaning of which is 
fun dam en tally visual. 
The other possibility we advanced was that the dancer's proper access to his 
dance is visual but not perceptual. That is, the dance is available as a visual idea. A 
trained dancer, it may be said, does not have to see himself, any more than 
Beethoven had to be able to hear the music he composed and, 1 suppose, played in 
his deafness. The training of a dancer's body trains his perception as well, and the 
training of his perception in tum develops his visual imagination to the point where 
he can reliably envisage his appearance. It is certainly possible that that should be 
the case. It may not be much use asking a dancer whether it is the case, because if 
we are not ourselves dancers we are unlikely to understand his answer. At least, in 
an analogous case, when musicians tell me that when reading an unfamiliar 
orchestral s·core they can effectively hear how the music would sound, I do not 
know quite what they are telling me, and in my innocence of such experience I do 
not know what questions I could ask that would make the matter plain to me. 
No doubt different dancers have different sorts of imagination , because that is 
what we find in other fieldls. Whatever the facts of the dancer's imagination may be, 
though, questions remaiin. The cognitive relevance of different modes of 
imagination and different kinds of imaging remains, after much painstaking inquiry, 
a baffling question. If a dancer really has a visual image of his body, we may ask, 
from what angle and what distance does he imagine himself? One hardly sees how 
there could be a definite answer to that question; but, if there is not, it is hard to 
see how the image he has could be visual in character. Again we may ask, does a 
dancer's image of his body reliably answer to the way his body really appears, from 
any angle? If not, what it affords is not information but illusion. Even i f  his image 
does answer to the way hfa body really appears, it will be no help unless he can 
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know that it does so. But he can only know that it does so if he has some other 
reliable means of access to the way his body looks:and. if he has that. his image is 
not necessary. Perhaps what hls bodily feeling affords him is a general confidenoe 
that he looks right. a confidence which he can at any time realize in a specific image 
of how he looks from any distance or any angle, but need not. 
In any case, however. the analogy we suggested between the unseeing dancer and 
the deaf composer fails. Beethoven, like many composers who are not deaf, 
composes in his head or on paper. He has no need to play his composition out on 
the piano; and, if he did. his playing would be relevant only in so far as it was 
audible to him in the same way that it would be audible to anyone else. Thus, the 
real analog of the composer is not the dancer but the choreographer. And as soon as 
I say that, it becomes clear that throughout this talk I have really been considerin.g 
a very special case, that of someone spontaneously creating the dance he is dancing, 
by dancing it. Quite different are the situations of. on the one hand. a member o f  
the corps de ballet whose task is t o  perform precisely and in unison with others the 
movemen ts he has been taught, and. on the other hand. a choreographer working 
out a dance by trying out steps for himself and trying them on others, in a process 
to which it is quite incidental whether his own body is one of those he uses. The 
case of the merely executant dancer, like that of the orchestral player we 
considered earlier, is not an example of art in the special sense that alone concerns 
us here; and the case of the choreographer does not raise the problem of the artist·s 
perception of his work, because what he is doing is having the dancers come to 
perform just those movements the audience will see in the completed dance. The 
only problematic case, it seems, is that of the soltary dancer creating a dance which 
is to have the status of a work of art, but which no one will ever see. In the heroic 
days of modern dance, the pioneers devoted themselves to their new art for which 
there was no audience, laboring to perfect dances without regard lo the possibility 
of anyone seeing them. What is one to say of such people� One could argue that 
they are beguiled by the idea of "art for art's sake", their inner motivation derived 
from their self-image as devoted artist rather than from any strictly artistic 
satisfaction to be found in the dance as experienced. But one need not. To envisage 
clearly the possibility of a work of art is in a sense already to have created it; to 
dance unseen is to achieve something that has choreographic meaning, and to have 
rehearsed a possible dance, even if on reflection we should have to deny that the 
dance dance as dance has not yet been fully achieved in any appropriate medium. 
What does seem to follow from what we have said is that to improvise a dance in 
solitude can only have the status of preparation, or rehearsal, or testimony, or 
reassurance: that to take aesthetic satisfaction in dancing for oneself alone involves 
some self-deception. But then, so do many popular activities. It may be because of 
this wide difference between the performer's access and the audience's access to the 
dance that solitary dancing figures in popular mythologies as a symbol of relations 
between the human and the divine. On the one hand, we have the jongleur de Dieu, 
the mute acrobat dancing at night before the altar in the deserted church; on the 
other hand we have the God who creates the universe by dancing it into existence, 
as among the Dogon of Mali God s son the Jackal, wearing the fibre skirt imbued 
with the first word revealed by his father, dances out the world and its future. 3 ln 
this latter case it is precisely the discrepancy between the inner access to the 
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meaning and the outer evidence of the movement that symboUizes the ontological 
gap betweern two levels of reality, between the essential world gods know and the 
existential world they create. 
What, firnally, has become of our initial question� h certainly appears that the 
idea of an art as a kind of activity which the artist can practice successfully because 
his own appreciation of his work is homogeneous with and reliably predicts the 
appreciation of others is somewhat shaky when applied to the performing arts, and 
shakiest of all in spontaneously creative dance. But no clear-cut alternative suggests 
itself. Perhaps the truth is that no general account is possible: that in different arts 
different relations between artist's experience and public's experience are possible, 
and that different artists are differently guided by what they can know of what 
they are doing and of what they are doing and of what others can know of that. It 
is, after all, preeminently true of living things and of human beings i n  particular 
that they are resourceful in meeting similar predicaments in a variety of ways. 
Artists and publics know of each other that they are human, and they may also 
have a general notion of what a given art is all about. Within those large 
understanding.5 there is ample room to maneuver. 
NOTEs 
Ducasse's position must be based on the supposition that every percept is the adquate 
expression of something or other, so that sheer expressiveness as such cannot serve as a 
criterion. He does not argue for this position, however. or even state it. To assess its merits 
would require a very elaborate discussion. 
2 The reference In the text to "two kinds of experience" is a gross oversimplification, running 
together an undetermined number of ways in which a person can have knowledge of what 
he is doing in doing it. But the simplification does not affect the argument in any way : what 
Is relevant is that the dancer differs from others by lacking something crucial that they have. 
The argument in the text is also misleading in that it implies that different kinds of 
experience coexist in the mind as different birds coexist in the bush. !Presumably all realistic 
accounts of experience are holistic. But, once one has made that point, there is nothing to 
be done about it. 
3 Cited by Judith Lynne Hanna, To Dance ls Human (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
1 979), SO, on the authority of Marcel Griaule, Conversations with ()gotemmeli (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1965), 187. 
80 
13
Sparshott: The Solitary Dancer: A Problem in Aesthetics
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 1981
